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PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY, ENFORCEMENT AND SMUGGLING:
A STOCHASTIC MODEL
ABSTRACT
This paper merges the existing smuggling literature with the literature
concerning competitive firm behavior under uncertainty. A stochastic, joint
product, model of smuggling is developed.

The model introduces production

uncertainty, generated by enforcement activity, into a Pitt (1981) type of
smuggling production function.

This modelling technique allows the trade

pattern and welfare results which evolve under smuggling with uncertainty to
be compared to smuggling in a world of certainty.

It is demonstrated that

mere presence of uncertainty increases the real resource cost associated with
smuggling, reduces legal and illegal trade, and welfare, when compared to
smuggling in a world of certainty.

PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTY, ENFORCEMENT AND SMUGGLING:
A STOCHASTIC MODEL
INTRODUCTION
The literature on illegal transactions in international trade has
expanded rapidly since the publication of the seminal article by Bhagwati and
Hansen (1973) .

The smuggling literature can be categorized as presenting

either: 1) deterministic models; or 2) stochastic models.
The model presented in this paper is a joint product stochastic model of
smuggling.

Joint product smuggling was first considered by Pitt (1981) .

Pitt's model is deterministic and was the first to demonstrate that legal and
illegal trade could coexist with the empirically valid phenomena of price
disparity.

Martin and Panagariya (1984) were the first to formally

incorporate uncertainty into a model of joint product smuggling. 1

They

introduce uncertainty through the use of a linear probability function,
applied externally to the smuggling firm's profit function.

Martin and

Panagariya were able to reproduce the welfare results of Bhagwati and Hansen,
as well as those produced by Pitt, depending on the assumptions imposed.
Another important contribution of their paper was the first explicit
examination of the effects

enforcement has on smuggling and welfare.

This paper extends the literature on smuggling under uncertainty by
transforming Pitt's model of smuggling into a stochastic model of smuggling in
the tradition of Sandmo (1971) , Batra and Ullah (1974) , and Ratti and Ullah
(1976) .

Uncertainty is introduced in the smuggling production function via a

1 Other papers employing stochastic models include, Scholer (1989), Sheikh (1989), Thursby
(1991), Fausti (1992). However, all of these papers fail to provide a link between smuggling under
uncertainty with the literature on the economic consequences of the competitive firm operating
in a world of uncertainty.

1

random variable, the smuggling success rate.

The smuggling success rate is

assumed to be dependent on the level of enforcement effort against smuggling.
The stochastic model presented in this paper allows an analysis of how
uncertainty affects the smuggling firm's input demand and output supply
decisions.

Unlike the earlier papers on smuggling under uncertainty, the

firm's input demand and output supply decisions and subsequent welfare
consequences can be compared to smuggling in a world of certainty.

The

stochastic modelling techniques applied in the analysis of smuggling for this
paper bridges the gap between the smuggling literature and the literature on
"the competitive firm under uncertainty".

II. PITT'S MODEL OF SMUGGLING
Pitt's model lends itself to the introduction of uncertainty through his
smuggling production function.

Pitt's original trade pattern and welfare

results will be compared to the results derived in the uncertainty model, to
determine the economic effects of uncertainty in the production of a joint
product export.
Pitt's basic model represents the small country case with fixed terms of
trade.

The country produces two traded goods, (X) and (M) , an exportable and

importable, respectively, with primary factors in perfect competition.
Production and trade are carried out by identical firms.
trade in exports is carried out by the same firm.

Legal and illegal

All firms smuggle in the

Pitt model and the law of one price holds in the domestic economy.

It is

assumed each firm can trade illegally according to "Pitt's smuggling
function",

(1)

s* = G(L,S).
2

The term (S*) is the quantity of good (X) successfully smuggled, (L) is
the quantity of good

(X)

legally traded and (S) is the quantity of good

used as an input into smuggling activity.

(X)

The function (G) is strictly

concave and a twice differentiable linear homogenous function.

The function

(G) is also assumed to have the following properties:
GL � 0,

(2)

1 � Gs � 0,

(3)

s - s• � o.

(4)

Assumption (2) states that the marginal product of legal trade used in
smuggling is non-negative.

Assumption (3) states that a unit increase in the

smuggling input (S) results in a positive, but less than or equal to, unit
increase in actual ex-post smuggling.
smuggling from being negative.

Assumption (4) prohibits the cost of

The difference between ex-ante smuggling (S)

and ex-post smuggling, s*, is the real resource cost or the

confiscation cost

of smuggling or both.
Maximization of smuggler's profits is given by equation (5),
� - p f•G(L,S) + p f•(l-t)•L - P 8 •(L+S)

(5)

where [Pf •G(L,S)] represents successful smuggling revenues and p f•(l-t)•L
represents revenues for legal trade and P 8•(L+S) represents the domestic
production cost of exports. The first order profit maximization conditions,

a�/oL, a�/as,

are respectively,

p f•GL + p f• (1- t)

pS '

(6)

p f .Gs

(7)

The term (P f), is the fixed international terms of trade and (t) is the ad
valorem tax rate.

First order conditions (6) and (7) state that the marginal

cost of an additional unit of tradeable will just equal its revenue in trade,
3

be it legal or illegal trade.

An additional unit of legal trade will result

in additional legal revenue p f ·(l-t) and additional smuggling revenue p f .CL·
Under the assumption of perfect competition, firms will earn zero economic
profits because the revenue from all foreign trade is just equal to the
domestic cost of exports.

Setting equation (5) equal to zero and solving for

p S yields an expression for the long-run equilibrium domestic price ratio as a
weighted average of all export trade,
ps - [P f •S* /(L+S)] + [P f •(l-t)·L /(L+S)].

(8)

Equation (8) is equivalent to Pitt's expression for the equilibrium domestic
price ratio in his model. Examining eq.8, a price differential is found when
comparing p S to p f(l-t).

Pitt calls this empirically valid price

differential, price disparity.
Pitt's smuggling production function, eq. l, embodies a technology that
requires the use of both legal and illegal goods as inputs to produce a
successfully smuggled good as part of a unit of a joint product tradeable.
The smuggling technology requires that a portion of the illegal good (input)
will be used up during the transformation process.

According to Pitt, during

the smuggling process some of the smuggling input is lost to confiscation or
some is lost to the real resource cost in excess of legal trade associated
with smuggling or both.

Therefore, the successfully smuggled good (output) is

less than the illegal input.

This "using up" of a portion of the illegal

input due to an excessive real resource cost is referred to as the Samuelson
"melting ice effect", by Bhagwati and Hansen.2 In the Pitt model, if there is
a melting ice effect, then smuggling has an ambiguous welfare effect as

2

See Samuelson's 1954 paper on trade impediments and transportation costs.
4

compared to the non-smuggling situation.

If the portion of illegal input lost

during the smuggling process is the result of confiscation by enforcement
activity, then smuggling has a strictly positive welfare effect.

III. SMUGGLING TECHNOLOGY
The purpose of the smuggling technology is to avoid detection so that
illegal exports are successfully smuggled out of the country and delivered to
the world market as (S*).

As in Pitt's model, it is assumed that the

smuggling production function embodies a melting ice effect due to a real
resource cost associated with the smuggling technology.

The smuggling

technology requires smugglers to engage in evasion tactics. 3

In contrast to

Pitt's model, the smuggling production function used in this paper is assumed
not to embody the confiscation cost associated with smuggling. It is also
assumed, that if smugglers do not engage in evasion tactics, then the
probability of detection is one.
The smuggling technology embodied in the smuggler's production function,
however, does not completely insulate the smuggler from detection and
confiscation. Thus, the contribution of the smuggling input (S) to successful
smuggling (S*) during the transformation process via the smuggling technology
is reduced by enforcement effort.
Assume the smuggling production function defined in equation (1) now
embodies the smuggling technology described above. Define the parameter (u),
as the smuggling success rate, having a value between zero and one.

Let S1,

The real resource cost can be due to special packing cost necessary to hide smuggled goods
or the excess transportation costs of shipping unreported production out of the country via
clandestine ports.
3

5

be defined as the amount of smuggling input that avoids confiscation during
the smuggling (production) process.

Define the relationship between S and S1

as follows,
(9)

This assumption allows the replacement of S with S1 in the smuggling
production function,

s* - G(L,S1 ).

(10)

If the smuggling success rate is equivalent in equations 1 and 10, then this
modification will not alter Pitt's equilibrium domestic price ratio, eq.8.
This implies that separating the real resource cost from the confiscation cost
of smuggling has no effect on s*.

The first order conditions (FOC) are

derived with the modification,
� - p f •G(L,S1 ) + p f •(l-t)•L - P8 •(L+S),

(11)

p f .GL + p f •(l-t) - p S

(12)

p f .G81 ·dS1/dS - P8 , where dS1/dS-u and

(13)

s > s 1 > s*.

(14)

The modified smuggling production function now only generates the real
resource effect described in Pitt's paper. The implications of condition 14
are: 1) the confiscation cost associated with smuggling is equal to S-S1 or
S•(l-u); 2) the real resource cost associated with smuggling is equal to S1 -

s*; and 3) an increase in u, increases the firms profit, i.e.,

6

IV. UNCERTAINTY IN THE SMUGGLING PRODUCTION FUNCTION
In the previous section, the real resource cost component and the
confiscation cost component of smuggling were separated by redefining the
technology of smuggling and introducing the smuggling success rate (u) into
the smuggling production process. Employing a variant of a modeling procedure
developed in a paper by Ratti and Ullah (1976), the smuggling success rate
will now be defined as a random variable.

Define (u) as a strictly positive

random variable with the variable's density function defined as f(u),

This modification will make the confiscation cost associated with
smuggling a random variable, and introduces uncertainty into the smuggling
production function.

The implication is that output (S*), the successfully

smuggled good, is now a random variable.

The incorporation of uncertainty

necessitates redefining the properties of smuggling production function so
that it is: 1) a thrice differentiable, concave, non-linear homogenous
function; 2) the marginal products are positive and declining; and 3) the
cross partial derivatives are positive.4

The introduction of uncertainty

into the smuggling production function leads to the first proposition in the
paper:

PROPOSITION I: The firm's (expected) output of successful smuggling when

uncertainty is introduced, ceteris paribus, is less than the firm's output
under conditions of certainty.
To establish the above proposition, Jensen•s inequality and the
definition of expected value are applied to the smuggling production function
4

The assumption of the cross partial being positive implies legal and illegal inputs are
complementary.
7

G(L,S 1).

Defining the expected value of (u) as E (u)-u, where E is the

expectations operator; certainty in this situation means to replace (u) with
(u). Then by the Jensen Inequality,

(16)

E[G(L,uS)] < G(L,uS),
and proposition I is established.5

An economic implication of the introduction of production uncertainty
into Pitt's model is that the mere presence of uncertainty, ceteris paribus,
increases the real resource cost of smuggling as compared to the case where
the firm is operating in a world of certainty.
The introduction of uncertainty into the smuggling production function
requires that the smuggling firm's profit function (eq.11) be redefined in
terms of utility.

It is assumed that the firm's utility function conforms to

the characteristics of a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and the
third derivative of the utility function exists.

n
U der these assumptions, the

firm's utility of profit function is,

(17)
with

U '(•)>O, and u• 2::. 0, depending upon whether the firm is risk preferring,
.L.
risk neutral, or a risk averter.
It is assumed that the firm's goal is to maximize expected utility from
profit.

The first order conditions are,

oE[ U(w)]/oL - E[ U '(w)•(Pf•GL + p f •(l-t)-P8)]
8
oE[ U(w)]/oS - E[ U '(•)·(Pf•G
8 1 •u- P )] = 0.

6

0,

(18)
(19)

The Jensen Inequality states that if a function is concave the following is true: E[h(X)] <
h(E[X)). The implication for the smuggling technology is that the output of successful smuggling
s· in an uncertain environment is less than the output of s· if production had taken place with the
expected value of the random variable S 1 , i.e., a certain environment. See Rao (1973, p.58) for
an explanation of Jensen's inequality.
8

The second order conditions are,
a2E [U(,r)] /aL2 - A1 - E [U•(,r) •(P f •GL + p f . (1-t)-P8)2 +
p f•GLL • U,

('If) ]

< 0'

(20)

a 2E [U(,r)] /aS2 = A2 = E [U• (,r) •(P f•G81•u- P 8)2 +
p f •Gs 1s 1•u2 •U'(1r)] < 0,

(21)

a2E [U(1r)] /aLas = B 1 = E[U•(,r)•(Pf•GL + p f ,(l-t)-P8)•(P f•Gs 1•U- P 8)
+ U' (1r) .p f ,u•G1 s1 1'

(22)

where it is assumed that,
A1·A2 - B 12 ... DET > O.

(23)

V. THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL TRADE.
In this section it will be demonstrated that the introduction of
uncertainty into the Pitt smuggling production function will generate the
following results: 1) under conditions of uncertainty, the risk averse
(preferring) firm will engage in less (more) legal and illegal trade than the
risk neutral firm; and 2) the risk neutral firm will engage in less legal and
illegal trade than it would under conditions of certainty.
The analysis begins by rewriting the FOC, eqs. 18 and 19 in the
following manner,
E [U'(,r)•(P f•GL + p f ,(1-t))]

= E[U'(1r)]·P8,

E[U'(1r)•(P f•G81•u)J = E [U'(1r)]•P 8.

(24)
(25)

Adopting Horowitz's (1970) alternative way of expressing the FOC, yields
p f ·E [GL+(l-t)] = P 8 - {P f•Cov [U'(1r), GL+(l-t)] / E [U'(,r)] },

(26)

and
p f•E [G81•u] = P 8 - {P f•Cov[U'(,r), G81•u] / E [U'(1r)]}.

9

(27)

From above it is clear that marginal revenue of the joint product is now
a random variable. Furthermore, the marginal physical product (MPP) and
marginal value product (MVP) of legal and illegal inputs are also random
variables.

Examining the covariance term in equations 26 and 27, it becomes

clear that when u•(w)

0, the covariance term is also equal to zero.

The

implication is that the risk neutral firm engages in joint product trade up to
the point where the marginal cost of domestic production of exports (P8 ) is
equal to the E[MVP] of legal and illegal inputs.

When U•(w) � 0, it will be

demonstrated that the sign of the covariance term becomes dependent on the
sign of U•(w). With respect to the covariance term in equation 26, the
derivatives
(28)

au• (w)/au= U•(w)•Pf •G s1•S
and

(2 9)

confirms that the sign of the covariance term in equation 26 has the same sign
as U•(w), since the sign of equation 28 is dependent on U•(w).

However, the

sign of the covariance term in equation 27 can not be ascertained.

However,

it can be demonstrated that when it is assumed that the elasticity of the
marginal product curve (I) for smuggling input (S1 ) has an absolute value of
less than one, then sign Cov= sign U·(� ):
I'= oG51 /as 1 • S1 /Gs 1 == S1 •Gs1s1/Gs1 > -1.

(30)

If equation (30) is true, then examining the derivatives of the two components
of the covariance term in equation 27 with respect to u,

(31)

a[u•GsiJ/ au= G81• (1 + I'] > 0,
and

(32)

au•(w)/au= U"(w)•Pf •Gs 1 ·S,
10

verifies that sign Cov - sign
is dependent on

•
U (w).

That is, since the sign of equation 32

•
U (w), and equation (31) is positive, sign Cov - sign

•
U (w).

The above results lead to the second proposition:

PROPOSITION II. When a firm engages in joinc produce crade under
condicions of un.cercaincy, che risk averse (preferring) firm will engage in
less (more) legal and illegal crade chan che risk neucral firm.
To establish the above proposition, the result of sign Cov - sign

•
U (w)

is applied to equations 26 and 27, and the following conditions are arrived at

>

z>

<.

pS

pS '

'

depending on whether

•
U (w)

(33)
(34)

.c. o.
7

According to conditions 33 and 34, the marginal cost of producing the
good to be used as legal and illegal inputs in joint product trade, (P8), is
less than, equal to, or greater than the expected marginal revenue of the
>·
tradeable, be it legal or illegal as u• '2 0. This implies that the risk
averse firm will engage in less legal and illegal trade than the risk neutral
firm, and the risk neutral firm will engage in less legal and illegal trade
than the risk preferring firm.

This discussion establishes proposition II,

given the conditions stated above.
Proposition II leads to the next issue: a comparison of the demand for
legal and illegal inputs by the risk neutral firm to the firm operating in a
certainty environment.

Equations 12 and 13 represent the firm's FOC under

certainty. Equations 26 and 27 represent the firm's FOC under uncertainty.
Now, our attention will focus on the marginal product terms found in those two
sets of equations.

n
U der the assumption that the third derivative of the

11

smuggling production function exists, the marginal product terms are defined
as functions of L and S under the FOC for the certainty case as: 6
(12a)
(13a)
and for the risk neutral firm operating under uncertainty,
(26a)
(27a)
Equations 12a, 13a, 26a, and 27a leads to the third proposition,
PROPOSITION III: A risk neutral firm will engage in less legal and illegal
trade, ceteris paribus, than it would under conditions of certainty.
To establish the third proposition, it is assumed that the marginal product
functions defined in equations 26a and 27a, are (themselves) concave
functions.

Concavity implies that the second order total differentials of the

marginal product functions are negative semidefinite.

The economic

consequences of the concavity assumption are: 1) the elasticities of the
marginal product curves are non-increasing functions of factor inputs,
on/oL � 0,

and oi'/oS1

�

0; 7

(35)

and 2) that legal and illegal inputs complement one another less and less as
more of each input is employed in the production of a joint-product tradeable,
(36)

6

A certainty environment implies that the random variable u is replaced with its expected
value, 0. One must also remember in eqs. 12a, 13a, 26a, and 27a, that pS represents the marginal
cost of domestic production of the export good.
7

The elasticity of the marginal product curve for legal trade in smuggling is defined as
,, = L·G LL I G L.

8

As noted by Ratti and Ullah, the concavity assumption imposed on the marginal product
functions is consistent with many of the common forms of production functions used in economic
analysis.

12

The concavity assumption allows a reapplication of Jensen's Inequality,
E [GL(L,u•S)] < GL{L,u•S)

(37)

and
{38)
The implication of inequality 37 for eqs. 12a and 26a is that the risk neutral
firm will engage in less legal trade than if the firm was operating in a world
of certainty.

The implication of inequality 38 for eqs. 13a and 27a is that

the risk neutral firm will engage in less illegal trade than if the firm was
operating in a world of certainty. Thus, proposition III is established.
When smuggling incurs a real resource cost in the Pitt model, Pitt
demonstrates that the welfare effect of smuggling is ambiguous. The
introduction of uncertainty modifies Pitt's ambiguous welfare result derived
under certainty. First, proposition I established that uncertainty reduces the
ability of smugglers to transform ex-ante illegal goods into ex-post illegal
goods, i. e. , the melting ice effect is magnified. Next, proposition Ill
established that under uncertainty, a risk neutral firm will engage in less
legal and illegal trade, than in a certainty environment.
Propositions I & III indicate that total exports will decline when
uncertainty is introduced.

A decline in exports, implies a decline in imports

and a shrinking of the country's trade triangle as compared to the certainty
case presented by Pitt.

Furthermore, the smuggler's transformation curve

under uncertainty is inferior to the smuggler's transformation curve in a
world of certainty.

Therefore, the introduction of uncertainty causes a

negative shift in the range of possible welfare levels presented by Pitt for
his ambiguous welfare case, i. e. , the trade triangle shrinks under uncertainty
as compared to a world of certainty.

In other words, the introduction of

13

uncertainty has a negative welfare effect regardless of whether the welfare
effect of smuggling under certainty was positive or negative. 9

Examining

this last statement in the context of proposition II, if it is assumed that
smugglers are risk averse, then the negative shift in the range of possible
welfare levels is even greater than for the risk neutral case. 10
Sheik (1989) contends that in the smuggling literature, the risk
associated with smuggling is modelled incorrectly. He argues that an implicit
assumption in the literature is that smugglers are risk preferring.

The

foregoing analysis provides an example that contradicts his conclusion.
However, under the assumption of risk preferring smugglers, smuggling under
uncertainty would expand as compared to smuggling under certainty. The
consequence of assuming risk loving smugglers in the above model would be a
positive shift in the range of possible welfare levels.
With respect to Martin and Panagariya and other authors employing
stochastic models of smuggling, their models are unable to make a distinction
regarding the effect uncertainty has on smuggling behavior and welfare
relative to smuggling in a world of certainty. The stochastic model of
smuggling developed in this paper fills a void in the smuggling literature
with respect to the effects uncertainty has on smuggling behavior and welfare
as compared to a world of certainty.

9

In Pitt's paper, figure No. 2 and his discussion on page 453 demonstrates that welfare levels
are bounded by U5 and Up which indicates an ambiguous welfare result in his model. The
introduction of uncertainty produces welfare levels bounded by E[U 5J and E[Up]. Comparing
welfare ranges between certainty and uncertainty, the first three propositions indicate that E[U5J
< Us and E[Up] < Up.
10

Sheikh (1989), notes that welfare under certainty is greater than welfare under uncertainty.
However, he provides no formal proof.

14

COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS I: CHANGES IN THE WORLD PRICE, THE

VI.

MARGINAL COST OF DOMESTIC PRODUCTION, AND TAXES
In the next two sections it is assumed that the firm is risk neutral.
The risk neutrality assumption is necessary in order to generate determinate
results from the comparative static analysis. In order to analyze the affect
of a change in the tax or world price of exports, the FOG, eqs. 18 and 19 are
rewritten under the assumption of risk neutrality in the following manner,
(39)
(40)

Invoking the implicit function theorem around the equilibrium values of
L and S, and then taking the total differential of Z1 and Z2 leads to the
fourth proposition:

PROPOSITION IV. An increase in the export tax rate, ceteris paribus,
will reduce the risk neutral smuggling firm's demand for legal and illegal
inputs. The decline in demand will reduce joint-product exports. which in turn
will cause a decline in imports and welfare.
To establish proposition IV all of the differentials except dL, dS, and
dt are set to zero.

It is now possible to derive the partial derivatives,

aL/at and as/at,
- p f ·A2

I DET < 0

(41)

as/at - -Pf ·B 1

I DET < 0

(42)

aL/at

Equations 41 and 42 establish proposition IV for the risk neutral firm. 1 1
They indicate that an increase in the tax rate will reduce the equilibrium
level of demand for legal and illegal inputs.

This result implies that the

consequence of a rise in the tax rate is a decline in joint-product exports.
Which leads to a decline in imports and welfare.

11

The terms, A 1 , A2 , 8 1 , and DET are defined by equations 20 through 23.

15

If all of the differentials except dL, dS, and dPf are set to zero, then
we have proposition V.
PROPOSITION V. An increase in che world price of exporcs, ceceris
paribus, will increase che smuggling firm's demand for legal and illegal
inpucs. The rise in demand will increase joinc-producc ex:porcs, which leads co
an increase in che councry's imporcs and welfare.
To establish proposition V all of the differentials except dL, dS, and
dPf are set to zero.

It is now possible to derive the partial derivatives,
(43)

Equations 43 and 44 establishes proposition V for the risk neutral firm.

They

indicate that a rise in the world price for exports will increase the
equilibrium level of demand for legal and illegal inputs.

This result implies

that the consequence of a rise in the world price for exports is an increase
in joint-product exports, leading to a rise in imports and welfare.
If all of the differentials except dL, dS, and dP8 are set to zero, then
we have proposition VI.
PROPOSITION VI. An increase in che marginal cost for che domestic
produccion of ex:porcs, ceteris paribus, will decrease che smuggling firm's
demand for legal and illegal inputs. The decline in demand will decrease
joinc-producc exporcs, which in cum will induce a decline in che councry's
imporcs and welfare.
To establish proposition VI all of the differentials except dL, dS, and
dP8 are set to zero.

oL/oP 8
oL/oP8

as;aps

and

as/oP8,

= A2 - B 1
= A1 - B 1

It is now possible to derive the partial derivatives,

I DET < 0

(45)

I DET < 0

(46)

16

Equations 45 and 46 establish proposition VI for the risk neutral firm.
Equations 45 and 46 demonstrate that a rise in the marginal cost of domestic
production of the good to be exported will decrease the equilibrium level of
demand for legal and illegal inputs.

This result implies that the consequence

of a rise in the marginal cost of domestic production is a decline in jointproduct exports.

VII.

Which leads to a decline in imports and welfare.

COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS II: CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF
ENFORCEMENT AND UNCERTAINTY
A change in the level of enforcement or uncertainty implies a change in

the moments of the random variable u, the smuggling success rate. Assume that
the effect of an increase in anti-smuggling enforcement efficiency, implies a
decline in the expected value of the smuggling success rate.

This assumption

leads to proposition VII,

PROPOSITION VII. An increase in enforcement: act:ivit:y against: smuggling,
cet:eris paribus, will decrease t:he risk neut:ral firm's demand for legal and
illegal inputs. The decline in demand will decrease the country's joint
product exports, leading to a decline in imports and welfare.
To establish proposition VII a decline in the expected value of the
smuggling success rate is analyzed by replacing u with u·- u+a in equations 39
and 40. Then, differentiating with respect to 8, and evaluating the resulting
changes in the demand for legal and illegal inputs at 9=0, produces equations

47 and 48.
A decline in 8 has the effect of shifting the probability distribution
of u to the left and decreasing the expected value of the smuggling success
rate for each level of legal and illegal inputs, without altering the shape of
the probability distribution.

The result of this distribution preserving
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shift in the mean is only determinate for the risk neutral case and is
presented below in eqs. 47 and 48.
(47)

as;ae

(48)
Proposition VII is established under the assumption that #>-1.

results in

oL/o0

and

as;ae

both being positive.

An implication of

This

aL/o9

being

positive, is that if enforcement activity against smuggling is increased, then
export tax revenues will decline.
Next, the effect of a marginal increase in uncertainty is considered.
To capture the effect of a marginal change in uncertainty, the distribution of
u will undergo a mean preserving change in the dispersion of the distribution.
The results developed below are only determinant in the risk neutral case. A
modification of equations 39 and 40 is now undertaken by replacing u with
u*=(a•u + B), where a is a shift parameter and B is a function of a with the
following properties:
1) B' = -E[u] = -u, and 2) B(a=l) = 0.
(a•u + B)•S.

This transformation implies that S 1 =

This modification leads to the next proposition,

PROPOSITION VIII. A mean preserving increase in uncertainty over how
successful smuggling will be, ceteris paribus, will decrease the smuggling
firm's demand for legal and illegal inputs. The decline in demand will
decrease the country's joint-product exports, generating a decline in imports
and welfare.
To establish proposition VIII, it assumed the firm is risk neutral.
Differentiating the transformed equations 39 and 40 with respect to a and
evaluating oL/oa and oS/aa at a=l, yields
(49)

and
(50)
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The signs of the partial derivatives derived above can be determined by
examining the following relationships:
E[S• G181• (u -u)] - Cov [S• G181, (u -u)]

(51)

and
E[G15 • (l+')• (u-u)) = Cov [G15 • (l+'), (u-u)) .

(52)

By ascertaining the signs of the above covariance terms, the signs of the
numerators in eqs. 49 and SO can be determined.
Examining the derivatives of the three components of the covariance
terms in eqs. 51 and 52 with respect to u yields,
8S• G81 1/ou < 0,

(53)

d (u-u)/ du - 1 > 0,

(54)

and
0 G1s • (l+')/ou < 0.

(55)

Under the concavity assumption imposed on the smuggling production
function and the marginal product functions discussed earlier, the signs of
the covariance terms are negative.
signs for the partial derivatives,

Negative covariance terms yield negative

oL/oa

< 0 and

as;aa

< 0, and establishes

proposition VIII.
The comparative static analysis of a change in enforcement or
uncertainty in this section was performed using the modelling techniques
developed in the "competitive firm under uncertainty" literature.

An analysis

of the effect of increased uncertainty on smuggling behavior or increased
enforcement's effect on the average rate of successful smuggling reveals that
in a joint product model, legal and illegal trade decline.

Therefore, welfare

will decline as enforcement efficiency or uncertainty increase.

The

stochastic model developed in this paper makes a contribution by providing
19

insight into how enforcement and uncertainty effect the smuggling firm's input
demand and joint-product (output supply) production decisions.

IX.

A BRIBERY MODEL OF JOINT PRODUCT SMUGGLING
The real resource cost associated with smuggling was defined in equation

14 as being equal to s 1 -s*.

Assume that bribes replace cloaking activities

as the source of the "melting ice effect", the difference between S1-s*. 12
If bribery payments are consider to be just an income transfer, then the
melting ice effect is rendered welfare neutral.
The substitution of bribery for cloaking activities in the certainty
model presented earlier generates Pitt's strictly positive welfare effect for
smuggling as compared to non-smuggling. However, the introduction of
uncertainty in section IV, demonstrates that the mere presence of uncertainty
will reduce the positive welfare effect of smuggling as compared to smuggling
in a world of certainty.

The implication of introducing uncertainty is that

the smuggler's bribery cost increases as compared to smuggling in a world of
certainty.

X.

SUMMARY.
A stochastic model of joint-product smuggling was presented in this

paper.

The stochastic modeling approach used in this paper extends the

microeconomic foundation of the smuggling literature by merging it with the
literature on firm behavior under uncertainty.
The stochastic model developed in this paper extends the crime-theoretic
approach to smuggling introduced by Martin and Panagariya.

The model uses

12 Martin and Panagariya, and Sheikh both discuss the issue of bribery being used as a tool
by smugglers.
20

enforcement as the activity which introduces uncertainty in the smuggler's
production function.

This allowed the modeling techniques developed in the

"competitive firm under uncertainty" literature to be used to analyze
smuggling under uncertainty for the first time.
The welfare and trade pattern implications of the preceding analysis
provides marginal support for Bhagwati and Hansen's policy conclusion of the
"less smuggling the better".

The level of support is marginal because the

very presence of uncertainty reduces welfare when compared to smuggling in a
world of certainty.
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
Production Uncertainty , Enforcement and
Smuggling : A Stochastic Model
1.

Another way to state Eq. 16 would be :

<

E [ G ( L, S 1 ) ]

G ( L, E [ S 1 ] )

a·s

where E [ S 1 ] •

2.

First order conditions, equations 18 and 19 :

EQ. 18 .

where d U ( n )
dn

EQ . 19

= U' ( n )

a E [ U ( ,i; ) ]

as

where dU ( n )
dn

=

,J dU ( n )

-l

dn

• an

as ]

= U' ( n ) , and
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3.

Second order conditions

For equation 21
A,i

= c32 E [ U( n ) ]

as 2

J d U( 1t )
""l d11: 2

=

a

01t + c321t • d U( 1t )

as

as 2

dx

)

Under the assumption of u•s 0, A1 and A2 are both negative.
it i s assumed A1 and A2 are negative.

'When U• > 0

For equation 22
Bi

= a2 E [ U ( n ) ]

dLaS

=

J d U( 1t )
"'l d7' 2
::i

� +

oL

a2 n

aLas

• dU ( x )

d11:

J

Taylor ' s Theorem state s that
a2 B [ U ( n ) ]

aLas

=

c32 B [ U ( ff ) ]

asaL

Impos ing the s econd order conditions, we have equation 23.
4.

Equations 24 and 25 are just equations 1 8 and 19 rearranged.
Equations 26 and 27 are written according to Horowitz, p . 364-367. Us ing
the following definition E (xy) - E (x) • E (y) + COV (X, Y) , equations 24 and 25
are transformed in equations 26 and 27. Remember that S1 - u • S
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For equation 28
a u' ( 11: > = du' < n > cm
au

dff

dS 1

as1 du

de/ ( 11: ) = U" (
ff )
dn

cm

s1

a

=

p r - Gs
i

A

dS 1

= S

du

a u' C n ) = U" ( 11: ) • p i.. ·S· G
sJ
au

The sign of EQ . 28 is the same as U· (� )
For equat ion 2 9
dS l

a [ GL + ( l - t) ]

s1

a

•

du

The s i gn of Eq . 2 9 is po sitive , thus s ign COV - Sign U• (w ) in Eq . 2 6 .
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For equat ion 31

G.i • ( 1 + E ) > 0

S 1 and by EQ. 30, equation 31 is positive if

where u • S

E

> - 1.

Equation 32 is identical to Eq . 28. Therefore, the sign of Eq . 32 is
the s ame as U· (� ) . The sign of Eq. 31 is positive. Thus, SIGN COV - SIGN
U · (�) in Eq. 27.
5.

The elasticity of the marginal product curve of legal trade is defined as

6. The a ssumptions imposed in eqs. 35 and 36 are consistent with the
assumption that the marginal product functions are concave.
For equation 35
at: =
as i

[5

1

1
• G,1,i.1 + G.,i,11 • G,i - 5 [ G,ui l a
£ G.1 J z

Concavi ty assump t i on - G11i,i .i <

Concavi ty assumption - Gr.u.

<

o , /\

<

0

i t assures tha t ..E!._1
as

O /\ i t assures tha t

26

-£t <

0

<

O.

For equation 36

The He ss ian matrices for the marginal produc t functions of legal and
illegal trade are negat ive semidefinite i f the condit i ons given in Eqs . 3 5 and
36 ho ld.
Le gal Tra de

!ff� > 0

I l legal Trade

27

Total different ials of Eqs . 3 9 and 40 . The total di fferent ials for Z 1
and Z2 are written under the assumption of risk neutrality . Thus , the FOC are
no longer wr itten in terms of utility .
dZ1 : E [ P r · Gu. · dL + p r · u · Gz..i · dS] •
- E [ Gz. • dp r + ( 1 - t) · dP r + p r ·Gu1 ·S·du - p r· dt - dP •]

dZa : E [ P r · G.1z. · u · dL + p r · u 2 · G.u1 · dS] =
- E [ u · G.1 • dP r + p r · G.1 · du + p r · u · G.1 •1 • S · du - dP •]
where du

can be rewri t ten in the fol l owing manner
- E [ P r • G.1

•

( 1 + £ ) ] dU

The Hess ian matr ix under risk neutral ity

IA! = DET A > 0
Comparative static analys is will employ Cramer ' s rule .
Eqs . 41 and 42 , the e ffec t o f a change in the export tax rate on L , S .

A ·

aL
at

aL
at
as
at

=

p r • ll

·-a

DET

<0

as
at

r
= -p . B1 < O
DET

Eqs . 43 , 44 , the effect of a change in the world price o f exports on L , S .
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a
L
0p r

A ·

as
ap rl

as
ap r

• 1

- B ( G£ + ( 1 - t) ]

- B C u · G..: l

]

A1 • [ -E[ u • G.1 ) ] - B1 ( -E ( G£ + ( 1 - t) ] ]

DET

>O

Eqs . 45 -46 , the e ffect of a change in the marginal cost of domestic produc t
for the good to be exported .

. [�]

A ·

Eqs . 47 -48 , examine the effect of a dis tribution persevering shift o f
the mean , i . e . , a change i n enforcement e ffort .

A .

[

a
L
iJ0

- E [ P r · Gui •S]

: • [- E [ P ' · G_, •
(1 +1) ] ]

An increase in 0 impl ies a decreas e in enforcement effic iency . Thus ,
the firm ' s demand for legal and ill egal inputs will increase . The c omparat ive
s tatus are set forth in Equat ions 47 , 48 .
iJL _ - E ( P r • Gui • S] • � - B1 • [ - E [ P r ' G•l • ( 1 + � ) ]
>O
DET
00 -
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as -_ - E { P " ' G•l ' ( 1 + e } ] ' Ai - Bi · [ - E [ P " • Gul • S] ]
DET

a6

>

0

An increase in a implies an increase in unc ertainty . An increase in
uncertainty will decrease the firm ' s demand for legal and illegal inputs . The
comparat ive s tatic results are set forth in Equations 49 , 50 .
A

.

aL

iJcs

as

acs

[

aL

aii

as] =

acs

-

=

- P "E [ GUl • ( u -0} • S]
- P "E [ G•l • [1 +c] • ( u -a) J

- P "E [ Gul

'

• ( u - 0} · SJ

Ai ' [ - P 1E[G81 '

'

• A;i - [ - P 1E [G8J
DET

( l + c ) • ( u - 0} ] -

DET

•

( 1 + 1 ) • ( u - 0) ] ·

[ - P "E [ Gu1

•

Bi

( u - 0) • SJ •

Bi

The DET in Eqs . 49 , 50 , are pos itive thus , the s igns of the partial
derivat ive s aL/oa , as;aa are dependent on the signs of the numerators .
The s igns of the partial derivatives der ived above can be determined by
examining the fol lowing relationships .
The s ign of Eqs . 49 and 50 are dependent on the numerators , s ince the
denominator is positive . The key to s igning the nume rators is the following
relat ionship : E (X • Y) - E ( X) • E (Y) + COV (X , Y) . Rewr iting equati ons 49 and 50 ,
we have ,
49a . E [ GL ai • S • ( u -u) ] - E [ S • GLa � ] · E [ u - u ] + COV [ S · Gtai , ( u -u) ]

50a . E [ G,1 · ( l+ e ) • (u-u) - E [ G.1 • ( l+e ) ] • E [ u - u ] + COV [ G.i • ( l+E ) , (u-u) ]

Howeve r , E [u-u ] - 0 , so equations 49a and 50a reduce to eqs . 51 and 5 2 .
51 . E [ GLa 1 · S • (u-u) ] - COV [ S • GLa l • ( u -0.) ]
By ascertaining the s igns of the covariance terms in equations 5 1 and
5 2 , the s igns of the numerators in equations 49 and 50 can be de termined .
Examining the derivatives of the two components of the c ovariance terms
with respect to u , will allow us to determine the s igns of the covariance
terms in eqs. � and -::ea.

5i

51
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Remembering that S 1
dS 1 =
du

11

= S

au

du

(a • u + B ) • S , and

•S A S1 = u • • S

o [ S • Guu l

d [ u - a]

-

=

•[

we have

dS1
]

oGu1.
as

,

du

1

1 > O , therefore COV [ S

·

Gu1 , ( u - Q) ] < O

The der ivative of the other covariance term with respect to u is now
analyzed be low .
a ca.1 + Gs1.s1 . 9 1 )
o [ G81 • ( l + e ) ]
au
au

aa.1

as 1

dS l

du

d C u -Q) =
du

+

1

dS 1
du Gsis1.

>o,

+

a a.1a1
as

1

dS 1 9 1

du

therefore cov[ Gs1

•

=

(1 + e ) , ( u -Q) ]

<o .

The above results demonstrate that the numerators in eqs . 49 and SO are
negative and thus we have the fol lowing results ,

o
oS
a« < 0 and a«L < 0 •
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